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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
THE ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN Mississippi: THE LEGISLATIVE
PROBLEM
William A. Mayhew*
In Pruett v. City of Rosedale,1 the Mississippi Supreme Court
abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity as to state govern-
ment, counties, municipalities and all other local subdivisions of
government. The court retained one segment of the doctrine, the
concept of official immunity for discretionary acts of public of-
ficials including legislative, judicial and executive bodies.
Recognizing the legislative problems presented, the court ordered
that the decision become effective as to causes of action accruing
on or after July 1, 1984. s
The purpose of this article is to examine, in part, the com-
plexity of the problem presented to the Mississippi Legislature by
this decision. Though Mississippi became the 45th state to judicial-
ly abrogate the doctrine,' the legislative answer is far more com-
plex than generally thought. For the legislature to properly balance
the competing interests and to develop a legislative approach that
is both sound and politically pragmatic, will require a great deal
of research, study and understanding. One of the major obstacles
that the legislature will have to overcome is the simplistic ap-
proaches that will undoubtedly be offered but that will not really
address the basic problems. Rather, the legislature should take this
opportunity to determine the boundaries of governmental tort
liability in Mississippi.
Though arguments have been made in favor of sovereign
immunity,3 the only argument that seems to have any real validity
*Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College. B.S. 1961, J.D. 1964, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles.
1. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
1.5 Such prospective overruling is constitutional. See Note, Prospectively Overruling the Common
Law, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (1962).
2. Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1047 (Miss. 1982). Cf, Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which deals with actions brought against
local municipalities and their officials for violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981).
3. The policy reasons for and against governmental immunity are well summarized in Flem-
ing, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610,
614-15 (1955) as follows:
Governmental immunity has sometimes been defended on grounds of policy. The argu-
ment is fourfold: (1) funds devoted to public purposes should not be directed to com-
pensate for private injuries; (2) "the public service would be hindered, and the public
safety endangered, if the superior authority could be subjected to suit at the instance
of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means
required for the proper administration of the government;' (3) that liability would in-
volve the government 'in all its operations, in endless embrassments, and difficulties,
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today is the saving of tax dollars.' Even this argument is without
merit since the citizen should not be expected to bear the costs,
individually in most instances, of government-caused injury. Large
governmental bodies may be good risk distributors' while smaller
entities can probably achieve the same result through insurance.
Not only does continuance of a general immunity for governmen-
tal activities fly in the face of reasoned thought and experience,'
the continuation of the doctrine, as in the past, would raise moral
concerns as to whether the legislature was fulfilling its functions
and accepting its responsibilities. This is not to say that the only
moral or just course for a legislature is total or almost total abolish-
ment. Rather, the legislature must carefully balance all the fac-
tors and seek essential fairness to its citizens and to the proper
functioning of the government. This can be accomplished by ex-
amining and balancing the tort concepts, including the fault prin-
ciples, and the essential duties and functions of government.
The citizenry is entitled to accountability from the govern-
ment. The immunity doctrine works toward the opposite, that is,
non-accountability, when government actions are immunized from
liability. Thus, a restructuring or abolition of the doctrine should
result in better government if, for no other reason, government
will have an increased awareness of safety in order to reduce or
minimize costs. Certainly, no one can argue against government,
as well as the private sector, having an increased awareness and
concern for safety.
and losses, which would be subversive of the public interests'; and (4) that unlike private
enterprise, the government derives no profit from its activities. To these arguments
it may be answered in part (1) that since the public purposes involve injury-producing
activity, the injuries thus caused should be viewed as a part of the activity's normal
costs, and no one suggests that it is a diversion of public funds to pay the costs of public
enterprise even if payment is made to private persons; (2) that while control of govern-
ment activity by private tort litigation may be involved where the alleged tort is legislative
action or the making of some high-level policy decision, no such thing is involved in
ordinary accident cases; (3) that the direct cost of making compensation by the govern-
ment will not exceed the sum of the losses suffered by the hapless victims of govern-
ment activity and that it is better to distribute these losses widely among the beneficiaries
of government than to let them rest on the individual victims; that the embarrassments
and expenses incidental to defending accident suits are also a part of the just social cost
of operations that cause injuries and have never stifled comparable private enterprises;
and finally (4) that, though the government as an entity does not profit from its enter-
prises, yet (it is devoutly to be hoped) the taxpaying public does, and it is the taxpaying
public which would bear the costs of government tort liability (footnotes omitted).
4. McMahon, The State as Defendant: The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Alabama, 41
ALABAMA LAWYER 583, 584 (1980).
5. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957). In this case the Supreme
Court notes the differences in risk distribution between the federal government and a small
municipality.
6. See notes 2 and 3, supra. The following cases involve either a partial or complete abroga-
tion: Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cook v. County of St. Clair,
[Vol. 3:209
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HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN
Mississippi
The development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
United States has been well documented elsewhere.7 The doctrine
was first mentioned, but not applied, in Mississippi in the 1844
case of County of Yalobusha v. Carbry.8 In 1852, in Anderson v.
State,9 the court held that a county could not be sued since there
was no statute expressly authorizing it. However, the court held
that the tax collector could be sued individually ° A long line of
cases then followed that continued to recognize the doctrine."i
In 1977 the court began hinting to the legislature that the
legislature was not only the proper body to deal with the aboli-
tion of sovereign immunity but that the time might be near for
it to do so. 2 In Jones v. Knight, a 1979 case, the court expressed
itself in this manner: "Abrogation of sovereign immunity strongly
appeals to the sentiments of us all, but, if it were done as sought
384 So. 2d I (Ala. 1980); Lorence v. Hospital Bd. of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 320 So.
2d 631 (1975); Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); City of Fairbanks
v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968);
Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopt v. Coming
Hosp. Dist., 35 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 174 Col. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130 (Fla. 1957); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Com-
munity Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Campbell
v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972); Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs of County of
Miami, 143 Ind. App. 155, 239 N.E.2d 160 (1968); Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d
21 (1969); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Hamilton v. City of
Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231,
111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975); Spanel
v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Jones v. State
Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Johnson v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512,
169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); Willis
v. Department of Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Rice v. Clark County, 79
Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Ayala
v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Mayle v. Pennsylvania
Dept. of Trans., 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978); Becker v. Beudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d
896 (1970); Ward v. County Court, 141 W. Va. 730, 93 S.E.2d 44 (1956); Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1961).
7. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4-9 (1924).
8. 11 Miss. (3 S."& M.) 529 (1844).
9. 23 Miss. 459 (1852).
10. Id. at 474.
11. See, e.g., Brabham v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Hinds County, 54 Miss. 363 (1877); State v. Vaughn,
77 Miss. 681, 22 So. 999 (1900); Rainey v. Hinds County, 79 Miss. 238, 30 So. 636 (1901);
State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, 150 So. 760 (1933); State Highway Comm'n v. Gully, 167
Miss. 631, 145 So. 351 (1933); Owens v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 264 So. 2d 892
(Miss. 1972); Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831
(1977); Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1979); McKlemurry v. University Medical Center,
380 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1980); Hattiesburg Realty Co. v. Mississippi Highway Comm'n, 406 So.
2d 329 (Miss. 1981). See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
12. Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977).
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by the appellant it would leave every state agency, institution or
branch of government vulnerable to tort suits. We think abroga-
tion, if ever accomplished, should be accompanied by
legislation ,,. The Jones decision was based on a 7-2 split
of the court. A strong dissent, arguing for immediate abrogation,
was written by Justice Bowling, the author of the Pruett decision.
In Davis v. Little" the court faced the issue of whether a county
supervisor driving a county-owned vehicle on county business was
covered by an official immunity. Since the county had not been
sued, the court pointed out that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was inapplicable. Mississippi, like the other states applying com-
mon law sovereign immunity principles, does not apply the doc-
trine of respondeat superior in governmental tort actions. As a
result, the governmental entity is not legally responsible for the
torts of its employees. Thus, the county supervisor faced personal
liability. The court recognized an official immunity for the discre-
tionary decision-making process. However, the court found that
immunity to be inapplicable on the basis that driving a car on coun-
ty business is a ministerial act.15
Municipalities in Mississippi have always been treated dif-
ferently than the state or counties." As a result, the municipalities
have faced more liability exposure. This exposure has been based
on a governmental-proprietary distinction which on application
has often made no sense except, perhaps, from a historical perspec-
tive. For instance, the maintenance and repair of sidewalks, 7
streets,18 sewers, 9 and traffic control devices2" have been held to
be proprietary.
As pointed out in Pruett, the Mississippi Legislature has
enacted a number of provisions that allow certain agencies to be
sued to the extent of insurance that was legislatively authorized.
The court then indicates, without really analyzing the statutes, that
the Pruett decision would have been unnecessary had the legislature
13. Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254, 257 (Miss. 1979).
14. Davis v. Little, 362 So. 2d 642 (Miss. 1978).
15. Id. at 644.
16. See Comment, A Case for the Abrogation of Municipal Tort Immunity in Mississippi, 41
Miss. L.J. 289 (1970). The theory has been that counties are subdivisions of the state while
municipalities are voluntary associations. Board of Sup'rs v. Payne, 175 Miss. 12, 23, 166 So.
332, 335 (1936).
17. City of Cleveland v. Threadgill, 246 Miss. 23, 148 So. 2d 670 (1963).
18. Byrnes v. City of Jackson, 140 Miss. 656, 105 So. 861 (1925).
19. Semple v. Mayor of Vicksburg, 62 Miss. 63 (1884); Thompson v. Winona, 96 Miss. 591,
51 So. 129 (1910).
20. White v. Thomason, 310 So. 2d 914 (Miss. 1975).
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expanded this concept to all governmental agencies.21 Though most
of the statutes limit recovery to the insurance proceeds and also
limit the agencies' liability to the payment of premiums, not all
do. For instance, there are no such limitations of the authority of
county boards and public school boards of education to purchase
insurance to cover official actions, "2 the purchase by county super-
visors of general liability coverage,2" the purchase of casualty and
public liability and property damage insurance by a municipal utili-
ty commission," purchase of insurance, including malpractice,
from a trust by certain hospitals,25 insurance procured by a hous-
ing authority," nor on insurance purchased for hunter safety
programs. "7 In addition, the state highway commission, the Bureau
of Narcotics, and counties are authorized to purchase liability in-
surance for motor vehicles, with recovery limited to the insurance
proceeds. However, this authority is limited to $10,000 for the per-
sonal injury of any one person and $20,000 where two or more
persons suffer injury in any one accident. Property damage is
limited to $5,000.28 Such limits, though they represent the coverage
minimums required by the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility
law, 29 are grossly inadequate in modern times."0 Even more disturb-
ing is the limitation on accidents involving school buses operated
by counties, the separate school districts, consolidated school
districts and junior colleges. Here claims are limited to $10,000
for any one person and $50,000 for any one accident."
The lack of any comprehensive legislative plan is further
evidenced by examining the governmental entities and where the
legislature has authorized insurance and limited recovery to the
insurance proceeds, without specifying the amounts of coverage,
while also limiting the agencies' liability to the insurance premiums.
Included are school districts and junior colleges concerning motor
21. Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1047 (Miss. 1982).
22. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-5-41 and 37-7-319 (Supp. 1982).
23. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-7-8 (Supp. 1982).
24. MIss. CODE ANN. § 21-27-17 (Supp. 1982).
25. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-13-101 (Supp. 1982).
26. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-33-11 (1972).
27. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-1-60 (Supp. 1982).
28. MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-1-8(p) (Supp. 1982) (The Commission's liability is actually limited
to the insurance premiums); Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-7-8 (Supp. 1982) (County Board of Super-
visors); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-108 (Supp. 1982) (Bureau of Narcotics' liability limited to
the premiums).
29. Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-15-36) (Supp. 1982).
30. Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 157.1 (West Supp. 1982), which requires insurance
on state motor vehicles of $100,000/$300,000.
31. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-41-4 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
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vehicles, 2 the official acts of board members and employees of
junior colleges,33 municipalities, including errors and omissions
coverage," the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board and
state port authority,3" and county park commissions.36 The agen-
cies' liability being limited to the insurance premiums would only
be of significance in case of insolvency of the insurance carrier.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM
A. Reinstatement of the Doctrine
The Mississippi Legislature will almost certainly face pressure
from the governmental bodies to abrogate Pruett and perhaps to
even extend the present immunities.37 As has been pointed out
previously, this would virtually amount to an abrogation of
legislative responsibility and would be a definite disservice, in the
long view, to the citizens of the state. Others may lobby for a com-
plete abolition of any immunity with government treated the same
as the private sector, as in New York3" and Washington. 9 This ap-
proach, though simplistic, ignores the realities of governmental
functions and duties and the essential differences that exist. For
instance, government provides services that are not generally pro-
vided in the private sector such as fire suppression, law enforce-
ment, welfare, streets, sewers, traffic control, and the various in-
spection services. The private sector determines the viability of
services usually on an economic basis; government usually can-
not evaluate its services and their continuance in this manner. In
addition, especially as to the state, there is often great geographical
diversity in the providing of governmental services." Finally, the
legislature must consider the many small governmental entities
32. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-7-304(a), 37-29-85 (1972 & Supp. 1982). See also Miss. CODE
ANN. § 37-41-41 (1972 & Supp. 1982) (school buses).
33. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-29-85 (1972 & Supp. 1982). See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-1-47
(1972) which authorizes municipalities to defend officers, agents and employees and to pay set-
tlements and judgments.
34. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-15-6 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
35. MISS. CODE ANN. § 59-5-37 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
36. MISS. CODE ANN. § 55-9-89 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
37. This was the experience in Missouri. See Note, Sovereign Immunity in Missouri: Judicial
Abrogation and Legislative Reenactment, 1979 WASH. L.Q. 865, 872 (1979). See infra notes 93
to 97 and accompanying text.
38. N.Y. JUD. PRAC. CT. OF Cts. § 9(2) (McKinney 1938).
39. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.030 (1962 & Supp. 1983).
40. See Henke, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law from a Natural Perspective, 48 OR.
L. REV. 95, 100-01 (1968).
41. Mississippi has always been a predominantly rural state. See R. HIGSHAW & C.
FORTENBERRY, GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF MississipPi, at 328 (1954); See also Me-
ridian Ponders City's Future While Budget Cuts Made, Clarion-Ledger (Jackson, Miss.) Dec.
[Vol. 3:209
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and their limited resources that exist here in Mississippi. 1
The largest number of potential injury claims are probably
in the area of motor vehicle accidents and injuries caused by
governmental property. 2 In general, immunity should not exist
in either of these areas. As to motor vehicle accidents, the govern-
mental unit should be responsible for the actions of its employees
like the private sector. One method of reducing costs to the govern-
ment, while insuring compensation to the injured person, would
be to legislate that, regardless of any insurance policy language,
any applicable insurance of the employee must be exhausted prior
to invading the governmental funds or insurance. 3
Another method to reduce costs would be to abolish the col-
lateral source doctrine, which prohibits the defendant's use of
benefits received by the plaintiff from third parties, as to govern-
ment and its employees and limit recovery to those damages in
excess of insurance proceeds, workers' compensation benefits,
social security, governmental benefits, employer-paid sick leave
and the like. To carry this out, subrogation actions against govern-
ment should also be extinguished. This would avoid double
recovery by victims, the transfer of insurance costs to government,
and thereby reduce costs to the government. Such an approach
would appear to be a proper legislative means of balancing the
interests of the citizens with those of government.
B. Limit Recovery to Insurance
A proposal that will probably be made, the predictability of
which is based on the language of the Pruett case, 5 is simply to
expand the concept of insurance as it already exists.46 One method,
26, 1982, at BI. Of Mississippi's 82 counties, 11 counties have a population of less than 10,000
while 70 are below 50,000. There is only one city with a population in excess of 50,000 (Jackson
at 202,000). Eight cities have populations between 25,000-49,999. More than half of the state
population lives in rural areas. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, GENERAL
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS -Mississippi, 26-7 to 26-10 (1980).
42. See, David & Frenc, Public Tort Liability Administration: Organization, Methods and Ex-
pense, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 348 (1942); Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small
Municipalities, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 363, 365 (1942).
43. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.6(c) (1983).
44. Cf CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333. l(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1983) which provides that a medical
malpractice defendant may introduce evidence of collateral source payments with plaintiff having
the right to show costs. Any rights of subrogation are extinguished if the collateral source evidence
is introduced. See also Ghiardi, The Collateral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery in Personal In-
jury Actions, 1967 INS. L.J. 457; Seidler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages:
The Irrelevant Principle and the Functional Approach (Part I), 58 Ky. L.J. 36 (1970), (Part II),
58 KY. L.J. 161 (1970). For the Mississippi law on collateral sources see Coker v. Five-Two
Taxi Service, 211 Miss. 820, 52 So. 2d 356 (1951).
45. Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Miss. 1982).
46. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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already in limited use in Mississippi, would be to reenact immunity
but authorize all governmental bodies to insure, limit the recovery
of the injured party to the insurance proceeds, and limit the agen-
cies' liability to the insurance premiums. The problem with this
approach is that there is no guarantee of insurance purchase. If
the agency does not purchase insurance, there is no recovery for
the victim because of the immunity reenactment. Thus, for any
such approach to work, the legislature would have to specify those
governmental activities to be insured, require insurance or self-
insurance, and designate the minimum acceptable limits. To do
less would allow insurance policies to be manipulated by the
governmental entities in such a way that coverage and dollar limits
could be narrowed with the practical result of returning to the past.
One of the interesting things about Pruett, if not changed by
legislation, is that the agencies given the authority to insure with
recovery limited to the insurance proceeds prior to Pruett would
now be the only agencies with limited liability.
Rather than basing the legislative scheme on insurance, in-
surance should be viewed as a means of funding the risk. The
legislature should note that the insurance issue, especially from
the standpoint of risk management, is much more complicated than
is normally thought. This is especially true as to the smaller govern-
mental units. As to these, there may exist a need for state
assistance 7 or for the creation, with the necessary legislation, of
a mutual insurance company made up of those governmental units
that choose this method over that of the commercial insurers. 8
There is also no guarantee that the commercial insurance market
will always provide the necessary coverages or that the coverages
provided will be affordable.
C. The Issue of Cost
The legislature will probably not be able to make reasonable
estimates of the financial impact of alternative proposals to be con-
sidered. However, a change in the doctrine will undoubtedly in-
crease the number of claims and significantly increase costs.4 The
47. See Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
363 (1942).
48. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-25 (1978).
49. See Note, Sovereign Immunity in Missouri: Judicial Abrogation and Legislative Reenact-
ment, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 865, 891-92 (1979). It has been reported that the Louisiana legislature
is faced with 15 million dollars of final judgments against state agencies and that some local govern-
mental units are unable to pay judgments against them. It is also reported that legislative efforts
to limit such suits were thwarted by the lobbying of the trial bar and organized labor. Times-
Picayune, The States-Item (New Orleans, La.) June 10, 1983, at 1-22.
[Vol. 3:209
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legislature must keep in mind that in the past these costs have,
in the main, been borne unfairly by the injured citizen and not
by the responsible governmental unit.
D. The Discretionary-Ministerial Acts Dichotomy
The Pruett decision retains the immunity for discretionary
acts.5" Such an immunity has been criticized in that it must be ap-
plied on a case by case basis5 and thus lacks predictability. One
commentator has noted that courts may have used the discretionary-
ministerial dichotomy as a judicial tool to deny recovery.2"
Discretionary exceptions are found in most of the statutory
schemes of other states that have previously faced this problem.
In fact, both New York and Washington, which purport statutor-
ily to equate government tort liability with the private sector, have
judicially created such exceptions to liability.
53
Though subject to difficulty in application, there are valid
policy reasons for immunizing discretionary acts. Discretionary
decision-making on a government level probably should not be
reviewable in a damage action since subsequent judicial or jury
review may have a dampening effect on government officials
resulting in a hesitation or refusal to act.5 If the legislature does
agree to immunize discretionary acts, it then faces the problems
of whether the immunity should be unqualified, that is, applicable
even in cases of misconduct, or qualified. The privilege has been
qualified by most legislatures to apply only to those who act in
good faith and without malice. 5 The legislature could also base
the immunity on different concepts such as reasonableness or on
a balancing of interests test such as suggested by Professor Jaffe. 6
In general, the other states have not followed these alternatives.
If the legislature does decide to legislate discretionary immuni-
ty, it then must determine whether to do so in a general manner
50. Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Miss. 1982).
51. Kramer, The Governmental Immunity Doctrine in the United States from 1790-1955, 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 795, 817 (1966).
52. Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209,
218 (1963).
53. See Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966); Herzog, Liability of
the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958).
54. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919
(1966).
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(7) (West Supp. 1982).
56. Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209
(1963).
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as under the Federal Tort Claims Act57 or to attempt to specifical-
ly enumerate certain areas of discretion as done in California. 8
E. Respondeat Superior
Another issue that the legislature should consider is whether
the governmental entities should be responsible for the actions of
their employees and agents while performing within the confines
of their employment or agency. In the private sector the doctrine
of respondeat superior applies and holds the employer liable. One
of the basic reasons for respondeat superior is that the employer
should accept the burdens as well as the benefit of the relation-
ships. Respondeat superior was not traditionally employed in the
area of governmental immunity. Thus, the governmental body could
be immune but the employee could be held personally liable. 9
In reconsidering this area following abrogation, there seem
to be no sound policy reasons for the legislature not to remedy
this situation by specifically addressing the respondeat superior
issue. Other legislatures have considered the problem and provided
for the defense of employees acting within the scope of their
employment.6" Many also provide for either the indemnity of state
employees" or authorize the procurement of insurance" for those
employees within the course and scope of their duties. If the
legislature opts for funding through insurance, it should make sure
that the governmental officials and employees are specifically en-
titled to a defense and indemnity, unless their actions are outside
of the scope of their duties or their actions render them guilty of
serious misconduct.
F Other Immunities
The legislature must decide whether to treat all the govern-
mental agencies within the state in the same manner or whether
to have different rules for the various governmental units. Though
there is validity to a differentiation between the private and govern-
mental sector, the validity of distinctions for liability purposes be-
57. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) provides an immunity where the claim is "based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . .whether
or not the discretion be abused."
58. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.2, 818.4, 850-850.8 (Deering 1973) (Legislators and
law enforcement officials, licensing officials, fire protection services respectively).
59. See, e.g., Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1979); Jackson v. Smith, 309 So. 2d
520 (Miss. 1975).
60. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (b) (1947); MINN. STAT. ANN. 3.736(9) (West 1974).
61. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8.239.05 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. 41.0349 (1957).




tween various governmental units is dubious, especially in view
of the availability of insurance. Therefore, it is recommended that
the legislature enact a legislative scheme which applies to all units
of government.
The legislature should also review the functions of govern-
ment within the state to determine if any particular activity of
government should be immunized specifically. In making such an
analysis the following should be observed:
1. Activities that are common to the private sector,
foreseeably cause numerous injuries, and are commonly
insured should not be immunized. An example of this is
the operation of motor vehicles.
2. Activities of government that are uniquely governmental
in nature and where one of the following also applies may
be properly considered:
a. The damage to the citizen is normally covered by
private insurance. An example here is fire suppres-
sion services. 3
b. Where the risk of injury is not substantial and where
the risk to the citizen should be reasonably apparent.
Hiking trails, nature areas and unimproved public
areas64 may qualify.
c. Where the imposing of potential liability may substan-
tially curtail the providing of a governmental service
that is of significant value to the general population."s
In addition, if the risk of injury appears low, there
is even more reason for potential immunity.6
d. Where the governmental activity occurs in response
to an unpredictable and seldom occurring stimulus,
thus rendering the training and response to such
stimuli difficult. Riot control is the most obvious
example.67
Only by closely reviewing the functions of the various govern-
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 850-850.8 (West 1954).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.8 (West 1954) (hiking, riding, fishing, and wilderness trails);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(3)(g) (West 1974) (unimproved public property); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 24-10-106(e) (1973) (natural conditions of unimproved public property).
65. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.8 (West 1954) (This section provides a limited immunity
for reservoirs of public entities, and canals, conduits, and drains used by irrigation districts to
distribute water).
66. This analysis is suggested in Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change,
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919 (1966).
67. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-904(7) (1947) which immunizes governmental entities and employees
where the employee is within the scope of his employment and there is no malice or criminal
intent on the employee's part and where the claim arises out of riots, unlawful assemblies, public
demonstrations, mob violence or civil disturbance.
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mental entities can the legislature properly apply the balancing
test and make the necessary legislative judgment.
G. The Legislative Responses of Other States
The legislature will undoubtedly want to review the actions
of the other legislatures following judicial abrogation. This will
highlight areas of concern of other legislative bodies that may be
applicable in Mississippi and the approach taken to their solution
elsewhere.
A review of the legislative response of a number of other states
reveals two basic approaches.68 First, a number of states have
waived sovereign immunity and then created statutory immunities.
These statutes generally immunize from claims the following: (1)
due care execution of a statute or regulation, (2) discretionary func-
tions, (3) activities arising out of the assessment or collection of
taxes, (4) quarantine and, (5) intentional torts including assault,
battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
cess, and defamation.69 A variation on the first approach is taken
in New York7" and Washington71 where abrogation is statutorily
complete. However, the judiciary in both states has created an im-
munity for discretionary acts.72 Arkansas has also basically
waived sovereign immunity as to the state by agreeing to pay ac-
tual, but not punitive, damages caused by state officials and
employees acting within the course and scope of their duties and
without malice but has retained it as to counties, municipalities
and other local governmental agencies."
The second basic approach is for the state to have reinstated
68. Professor Van Alstyne in a 1966 study suggested 5 basic approaches: (1) modified com-
mon law liability and immunity; (2) general immunity with specific statutory exceptions; (3) general
tort liability within statutory damage limitations; (4) general liability with specific statutory ex-
ceptions; and (5) specifically defined liabilities and immunities. Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 969-74 (1966).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1962); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815, 816.6, 821.4, 855.6 (im-
munity for health and safety inspections), 818.2 (immunity for adopting or failing to enforce a
law), 818.2 (immunity for legislation and law enforcement), 818.4 (immunity for decisions by
licensing officials), 820.2 (discretionary functions immunity); 830-835.4 (liability of public enti-
ty for dangerous condition of property), 850-850.8 (immunity for fire protection services), 844-846
(care and rehabilitation of criminals) and 854-856.4 (public health and hospital services) (West
1980). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (1947); MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 2-10 (Michie/Law
Co-op 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8, 209 (1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. §41.031-41.0333 (1978). Placing California in this category is purely arbitrary.
70. N.Y. JUD. PRAC. CT. OF CLS. § 9(2) (McKinney 1938).
71. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.030 (1961 & Supp. 1982).
72. See Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10
SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246,
407 P.2d 440 (1965), and Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966).
73. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3401 and 12-2901 (1979). Thus, the state has legislated respon-
sibility for its state officers and employees who are within the course of their duties and acting
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immunity and then created certain statutory exceptions. The ex-
ceptions are generally for motor vehicles and for dangerous and
defective conditions of public property.7 ' A variation on this se-
cond approach is employed in Michigan"5 and Utah"" where the
immunity only applies, with certain exceptions, to governmental
functions.
On the issue of respondeat superior, the statutes studied com-
monly provide for the indemnification and defense of officials and
employees acting in the course of their duties who are without
serious misconduct. 7 Florida specifically provides that a public
official or employee cannot be held personally liable or even named
as a defendant unless acting "in bad faith or with malicious pur-
pose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and wilful disregard of
human rights, safety or property.""
A large number of the jurisdictions studied limit recovery.
However, there is no general consensus as to the amounts. The
range includes a limitation on personal injury and wrongful death
of $150,000 per person and $400,000 per incident in Colorado; 9
$100,000/$300,000 in Florida,8" Idaho"' and Utah; 2
$300,000/$500,000 in Indiana" and New Mexico;"4
$100,000/$500,000 in Minnesota;8" $100,000/$800,000 in Missouri;"
individual claims of $50,000 in Kentucky; 8' $100,000 in Maryland;"
and $100,000 per incident in North Carolina."" Many of these
statutory limits do not apply if the entity has insurance in excess
of the limits. Though such limitations in some circumstances will
be unfair, they do have a valid basis in allowing governmental en-
in good faith. No recovery could be had unless a state employee or officer could be sued indiv-
dually. ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 320 provides that the state of Arkansas cannot be made a defendant
in Arkansas courts. However, state subdivisions, including municipalities, are declared immune,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2903, and an injured person can collect that amount. See Sturdivant v.
Farmington, 255 Ark. 415, 500 S.W.2d 769 (1973).
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3 (Burns
1971 & Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8103-8104 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.600 (Vernon 1951 & Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (1978).
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1407 (West Supp. 1982).
76. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 - 63-30-10(1) (1953).
77. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-5 (Burns 1971 & Supp. 1982).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9)(a) (West Supp. 1982).
79. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114 (1973).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5) (West Supp. 1982).
81. IDAHO CODE §6-926 (1947).
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-29(b) (1953).
83. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1971 & Supp. 1983).
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (1978).
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(4) (West 1980).
86. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.610(2) (Vernon 1951 & Supp. 1982).
87. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.070(5) (Baldwin 1980).
88. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403(b) (1957).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.291 (1978).
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tities to put a cap on high verdicts and for acquiring sufficient in-
surance coverage. 0 Many disallow punitive damages. '
Most of the statutes authorize or even require the purchase
of insurance.92 Some allow public entities to form their own mutual
insurance companies in order to provide coverage." Others pro-
vide that any liability insurance of the employee will be primary.94
Which approach or combination of approaches the legislature
adopts will depend on how it decides to approach the problems
discussed and how firm a grip the legislature wishes to retain.
Clearly the legislature is going to be concerned about cost. With
the other suggestions contained in this article, it is suggested that
regardless of the particular legislative scheme chosen, the
legislature adopt statutory limits as to the size of any verdicts or
settlements and provide for periodic payments in those cases where
it appears appropriate to safeguard the interests of the injured per-
son and the public entity involved.
THE 1983 REGULAR SESSION
The Mississippi Legislature in its first opportunity to deal with
the Pruett decision, the 1983 Regular Session, failed to enact a
comprehensive statutory scheme to address the problem of govern-
ment entity liability. House Bill No. 904, which passed the House
but was not enacted, would have more than restored the previous
status quo. Section 2 of that bill declared that the state and its
political subdivisions would be immune from "any wrongful or
tortious act or omission . " regardless of the "governmental,
proprietary, discretionary or ministerial nature . " of the act
or omission. s
Had House Bill No. 904 been enacted, municipalities would
have been immune from their previous exposure for proprietary
activities. 6 In addition, the status and continued viability of those
code sections authorizing certain governmental agencies to pro-
cure insurance and authorizing suit against them, some of which
limited recovery to the insurance proceeds, 7 would be in question.
90. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
919, 971 (1977).
91. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-4 (Bums 1971 & Supp. 1982).
92. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-18 (Burns 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.610.1
(Vernon 1951 & Supp. 1981).
93. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.620 (Vernon 1982); cf, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-25 (1978),
which provides for the state to set up a public fund in the event that municipalities or counties
cannot get commercial insurance or it becomes unreasonably expensive.
94. See supra note 41. Cf, 16R. ANDERSON, COUCH ON INSURAN cE § 62.49 (2d ed. 1959).
95. H.B. 904, Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983).
96. See Comment, supra note 14 and note 18 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 20 to 34 and accompanying text.
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Far more interesting were the provisions of House Bill No.
904 as originally introduced.98 The original bill did attempt to ad-
dress at least some of the issues presented by Pruett. Section 2
of the original bill, the broad reenactment of sovereign immunity,
was identical to that of the bill approved. However, Section 3 of
the original bill would have waived the immunity to the extent of
the maximum coverage of insurance as certified by the Depart-
ment of Insurance. Section 9 of the original bill imposed a max-
imum lid on recovery of $100,000 for property damage per single
occurrence, $300,000 per person for all damages other than pro-
perty damage per occurrence and $500,000 for all claims arising
out of a single occurrence. Section 9 would apply even if the enti-
ty had insurance limits in excess of the stated amounts.
Section 10 of the original bill would have created a special
Tort Claims Fund. Under this proposal, the state, and those political
subdivisions that so desired, would participate in an insurance plan
administered by the Department of Insurance. The Department
of Insurance would determine what governmental activities were
to be insured, based on an administrative determination of the en-
tities' potential liability under the proposed bill. However, since
liability under the proposal co-existed with insurance, the Depart-
ment of Insurance would be determining administratively where
governmental liability, except as specifically precluded, would ex-
ist. Such an administrative delegation seems unwise. As an alter-
native to the Tort Claims Fund, Section 10 would have further
provided for a political subdivision to obtain its own insurance
or self-insure with certification by the Department of Insurance.
Though the proposed Section 10 provided for a loss of tax revenues
to counties and municipalities for not obtaining the certificate of
insurance coverage from the Department of Insurance, the pro-
posed bill failed to deal with the problem of a non-complying
political subdivision which did not have a valid certificate of in-
surance on the date of accrual of a citizen's cause of action. A
literal reading of Section 3 would deprive that citizen of the waiver
of immunity.
Section 4 of the original bill also contained provision for im-
munizing public employees for personal liability, though they could
be joined as defendants with the governmental entity, so long as
the employee's act or omission occurred while in the course and
scope of his employment. The original bill also provided for in-
demnification and a defense for such employees.
98. H.B. 904, Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983) (as originally introduced).
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Section 5 of the bill, prior to amendment, proposed 10 specific
immunities. They would apply regardless of insurance though
language of the bill did not so specify.99 Many of the proposed
immunities were similar to those enacted by other states. A number
covered specific functions which are discretionary in nature and
should be immunized.
99. H.B. 904, Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (1983) (as originally introduced). The specific im-
munities proposed were:
(a) Arising out of a legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative ac-
tion of a legislative or judicial nature;
(b) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a
statute, ordinance or regulation, whether or not the statute, ordinance or regula-
tion be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity
or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused;
(c) Arising out of an injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt a statute, or-
dinance or regulation or by failing to enforce any statute, ordinance or regulation;
(d) Which is limited or barred by the provisions of any other law;
(e) Arising out of the exercise of discretion in determining whether or not to seek
or provide the resources necessary for the purchase of equipment, the construction
or maintenance of facilities, the hiring of personnel and, in general, the provision
of adequate governmental services;
(f) Arising out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, ap-
proval, order, or similar authorization where the governmental entity or employee
is authorized by law to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued,
denied, suspended or revoked;
(g) Arising out of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee, or the detention
of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer;
(h) Arising out of the imposition or establishment of a quarantine, whether such
quarantine relates to persons or property;
(i) Of any claimant whose injury is covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law
of this state;
(j) Under circumstances where liability has been or is hereafter assumed by the
United States, to the extent of such assumption of liability, including but not limited
to any claim based on activities of the Mississippi National Guard when such claim
is cognizable under the National Guard Tort Claims Act of the United States, 32
USC 715, or when such claim accrues as a result of active federal service or state
service at the call of the Governor for quelling riots and civil disturbances;
(k) Arising out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways,
roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such a plan or design is
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect
at the time of preparation of the plan or design, approved in advance of the con-
struction or approved by the legislative body or governing authority of a govern-
mental entity or by some other body or administrative agency, exercising discre-
tion by authority to give such approval;
(1) Arising out of an injury caused solely by the effect on the use of streets and
highways of weather conditions;
(in) Arising out of the usual care and treatment, or lack of care and treatment,
of any person at a state hospital or state corrections facility where reasonable use
of available appropriations has been made to provide care;
(n) Arising out of loss, damage or destruction of property of a patient or inmate
of a state institution;
(o) Arising out of any loss of benefits or compensation due under a program of
public assistance or public welfare;
(p) Arising out of or resulting from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstra-
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In addition to House Bill No. 904, which was not enacted,
Senate Bill No. 2454 was introduced and enacted."° This bill was
obviously a stop-gap measure since it is repealed as of July 1, 1986.
This bill amends Section 41-13-11 of the Mississippi Code and pro-
vides that counties, municipalities and their subdivisions, but not
the state, are immune from liability for tortious acts or omissions
arising out of the operation of hospitals, nursing homes, community
hospital facilities and community health programs. The section
is further amended to authorize the buying of insurance and, to
the extent of available funds (whether insurance or governmental
funds is meant is unclear), to indemnify agents, employees,
trustees, officers and volunteers. The amended section also limits
liability to the amount of the insurance proceeds. In addition, the
bill waives immunity to the extent of $500,000 for all damages
from any single occurrence. Hopefully, the next legislature will
avoid this type of a piecemeal approach.
CONCLUSION
The legislature is now faced with the complex problem of
restructuring the rules of governmental tort liability. To do this
in a manner that represents essential fairness to the citizen and
yet is affordable to all of the varied governmental entities in
Mississippi is a challenging and complex problem. This article
has attempted to explore some of these problems and suggest some
solutions.
tions, mob violence or civil distrubances; or
(q) Arising out of an injury caused by the condition of unimproved real property
owned by the governmental entity, which means land that the governmental entity
has not improved, and appurtenances, fixtures and attachments to the land that the
governmental entity has neither affixed nor improved.
Subdivision (i), above, is a good example of the need for study and analysis of proposed im-
munities. If the immunity is a valid one because the claimant has received workers' compensation
benefits, why limit immunity only to benefits received under the Workmen's Compensation Law
of Mississippi. Any such provision is highly debatable since often such recoveries are inadequate.
Allowing the governmental entity to take advantage of this collateral source by either allowing
its introduction into evidence or providing for a credit, while avoiding immunity, may be far more
equitable.
100. S.B. 2454, Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983).
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